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Abstract: 
We propose a speculative attack model in which agents receive multiple public signals. It is 
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process defines players’ private value. The main result is to show that equilibrium uniqueness depends 
on two conditions: (i) signals are sufficiently dispersed (ii) private beliefs about the relative precision 
of these signals sufficiently differ. We derive economic policy implications of such a result. 
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1 – Introduction 
Speculative attacks are based on information which is in parts publicly available or provided 
by media and agencies that are recognised by all major traders on foreign exchange markets. 
Public information is not just helpful in predicting the future course of an economy, but also 
induces higher order beliefs that allow for crises occurring out of self-fulfilling beliefs. In this 
paper, we analyze the question whether multiple sources of public information prevent self-
fulfilling prophecies. 
Second generation speculative attack models in the tradition of Obstfeld (1986, 1996) can 
be modelled as coordination games with multiple equilibria. Whether a central bank 
devaluates a currency depends on market pressures that arise from traders’ beliefs about the 
probability of devaluation. If traders believe in devaluation and speculate against a currency, 
market pressure may force a central bank to abandon a peg that it would have kept without the 
additional pressure generated by speculators. Applying the global-game approach, Morris and 
Shin (1998) have shown that this kind of coordination games has a unique equilibrium, if 
traders’ information is private instead of public.1 Morris and Shin (2003) and Hellwig (2002) 
show that equilibrium uniqueness requires that agents attach a sufficiently large weight to 
private information when both, private and public signals are available. Bayesian rationality 
requires that weights are positively related to the precision of information, which is the 
inverse of the variance of the respective signals. Thus, uniqueness relies on private signals 
being sufficiently precise in comparison to public signals. The most precise information, 
however, is provided publicly by transparent central banks and well informed agencies. This 
raises concerns of whether economic transparency may lead the inclination to self-fulfilling 
prophecies. One counterargument is that agents deal the same information differently and 
posterior beliefs are private information even if all information about economic fundamentals 
is publicly available. 
While many figures about an economy are provided publicly and become common 
knowledge (at least in theory), the precision of these figures is usually not public information. 
A rare exception is the reports by the Bank of England that publishes “fan charts” in addition 
                                                 
1 A signal is private information if it is received by a single agent and public information if it is received by all 
agents, all agents know that all agents received the same signal, and so on. 
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to inflation forecasts.2 With multiple public signals, beliefs about the relative precision of 
these signals may differ between agents and lead to different posterior beliefs about the state 
of the world. 
In this paper, we introduce multiple sources of public information in the currency-attack 
model by Morris and Shin (1998, 2003). Agents receive noisy public signals and have 
different opinions about the relative precision of these signals. We analyze conditions for 
uniqueness of the equilibrium. 
The model has a unique equilibrium, if there are sufficiently many or strong 
announcements that hint at states at which either attacking or not-attacking are dominant 
strategies. In addition, there must be a sufficient mass of agents who attribute enough weight 
to these signals, so that attacking or non-attacking, respectively, are dominant strategies given 
their posterior beliefs.  
Because, an algebraic solution is intractable for a general number of public signals, we 
restrict our formal analysis to three cases distinguished by the number of public signals. Each 
of the three cases gives an additional insight for the intuition that carries over to more general 
cases. If there are just two signals and agents’ beliefs about the relative precision of these 
signals has a uniform distribution, there is a unique equilibrium if and only if at least one of 
the signals indicates a state at which neither attacking nor non-attacking is a dominant 
strategy. With more than two signals or with a uni-modal distribution of beliefs about their 
precision, uniqueness may require that signals are sufficiently different and agents put a 
sufficiently strong weight on the most extreme signals. When the number of agents 
approaches infinity, the distribution of posterior beliefs becomes common knowledge. This 
turns the private-information game into a private-value game, for which we know that it has a 
unique equilibrium, provided that there is a sufficient mass of agents for whom either action is 
a dominant strategy (Dönges and Heinemann, 2001). In our model, this requires that the 
average precision of public signals is sufficiently low. 
In terms of economic policy, we conclude that the central bank should benefit from at least 
two tools: if used appropriately, number and precision of public announcements can be 
effective at stabilising the economy in situations where it might be prone to self-fulfilling 
crises otherwise. The provision of different specialized data about the fundamentals of an 
economy reduces the inclination to self-fulfilling prophecies in comparison to the provision of 
                                                 
2 Fan charts indicate estimated probabilities for future inflation rates. These probabilities account for estimated 
forecast errors, but not for possible errors in the model underlying these estimates. 
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just one compound announcement. With a sufficiently large number of public signals, the 
probability that an economy is hit by a crisis due to self-fulfilling beliefs can be reduced to 
almost zero, provided that these signals are not too precise.  
Section 2 introduces the formal model. In Section 3 we give conditions for equilibrium 
uniqueness. We solve the model for three special cases and develop the intuition that yields 
robust insights in the interaction between the distribution of signals and the distribution of 
private beliefs for the determinacy of equilibrium behaviour. In section 4 we draw 
conclusions for the optimal modes of information dissemination. Section 5 concludes the 
paper by summing up the main results.  
2 – Model 
The model builds on the reduced form of a currency-attack game introduced by Morris and 
Shin (1998, 2003). It deals with an open economy in which the central bank has anchored its 
exchange rate on a fixed parity. Our main innovation is the introduction of multiple public 
signals.  
2.1. Reduced form game 
There is a continuum of agents [ ]1,0∈i  who decide simultaneously whether or not to attack 
the currency peg by short selling one unit of domestic currency. An attack is associated with 
transaction costs 0>t  that are linked to the differential of interest rates between domestic and 
foreign currency. The fundamentals of the economy are summarized by an aggregate state 
variable θ . If the proportion of agents who decide for attacking the currency exceeds θ , the 
central bank devaluates the currency and attacking agents earn an amount tR > . If the 
proportion of attacking agents is less than or equal to θ , the central bank keeps the peg and 
attacking agents just loose transaction costs. A high (low) value of θ  represents a good 
(respectively bad) fundamental state. If 1≥θ , the economy is in a sound condition where the 
central bank can always defend the currency against an attack. If 0<θ , the currency must be 
devaluated even without the additional market pressure from speculating traders. The 
aggregate state θ  may be interpreted as a measure of the additional market pressure from 
speculation that is needed to enforce devaluation. 
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If a speculator knows that 0<θ , attacking is a dominant strategy, because it leads to a 
positive payoff independent of the other traders’ actions. If a trader knows that 1≥θ , it is a 
dominant strategy not to attack, because an attack cannot be successful. If it is common 
knowledge amongst traders that 10 <≤ θ  there are two equilibria in pure strategies: either all 
traders believe in devaluation and attack the currency. In this case, the central bank gives in 
and beliefs turn out to be correct. Or, traders do not believe in devaluation and abstain from an 
attack. In this case, the central bank keeps the peg and beliefs are also fulfilled. 
2.2. Different informational assumptions 
Morris and Shin (2003) distinguish private and public information by assuming that each 
agent receives two signals, ix  and y, that differ from θ  by independent noise terms with 
normal distributions. Signal ix  is private information of the respective agent i, while the 
public signal y is commonly observed by all agents. If the variance of θ−ix  is sufficiently 
small in comparison to the variance of θ−y , the model has a unique equilibrium with a 
threshold function )(* yx , such that for a given public signal y all agents with signals 
)(* yxxi <  attack the currency, while agents with higher signals do not attack. 
Metz (2002) and Bannier and Heinemann (2005) analyze the comparative statics of the 
equilibrium with respect to signals’ precision, provided that the condition for uniqueness 
holds. Heinemann and Illing (2002) suggest that public information should be intermediated 
by private agencies to prevent agents from exactly inferring which information other agents 
possess.  
If public information is relatively more precise, so that   
 π
θθ
2
)()( −<−
ixVaryVar , 
then the model has multiple equilibria and the thresholds to attack are not uniquely 
determined for all y. Here, an attack can be triggered by events that are unrelated to economic 
fundamentals (sunspots), because traders’ beliefs are self-fulfilling. In this light, transparency 
can have destabilizing effects: if central banks provide accurate information about their 
foreign currency reserves and publish their statistics and predictions about the future course of 
the economy, the high precision of this information raises the danger of sudden currency 
crises triggered by unpredicted shifts of beliefs.  
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On the other hand, public information is not homogeneous. There is a plurality of channels 
via which information is provided to the public and even central banks publish different kinds 
of information that may be more or less relevant for predicting future exchange rates. These 
bits and peaces of information differ in their relevance for predicting the aggregate state 
summarized by θ . Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that traders agree on the relative 
importance of various kinds of information for predicting θ . In the absence of a commonly 
agreed model (or a common prior) agents may even be aware about their different evaluations 
and agree to disagree. Consequently, agents may hold different posterior beliefs even if they 
all receive the same signals about the state of the economy. This raises the question whether 
multiple sources of public information with unknown precisions are sufficient to guarantee a 
unique equilibrium.  
As so often, the answer is that “it depends.” In the following pages we analyze conditions 
under which multiple sources of public information lead to a unique equilibrium.    
2.3. Multiple Public Signals 
We extend the model by introducing 1>K  public signals received by speculators. Each 
signal ky  differs from the fundamental state θ  by a noise term with a normal distribution, i.e.  
kky εθ += , with ),0(~ 2kk N τε . Noise terms εj and εk are pair-wise independent for all 
kj ≠ . Denote the vector of public signals by ),...,,( 21 KyyyY =  and assume (without loss of 
generality) that Kyyy ≤≤≤ L21 . We interpret each k as one source of public information. 
Each agent takes into account the whole vector of K commonly observable signals. But, they 
do not know the true variances and attribute subjective weights to each of these signals.  
The posterior associated with a vector of normally distributed signals Y is a weighted 
average of these signals, ∑
=
=
K
k
kk yqYE
1
)|(θ , where the weights are given by the relative 
precision (inverse variance) of these signals, 
∑
=
= K
k k
k
kq
1
2
2
1
1
τ
τ . The conditional variance is given 
by 
∑
=
= K
k k
YV
1
2
1
1)|(
τ
θ .   
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We assume that agents know the aggregate level of uncertainty in the economy, so that 
)|( YV θ  is common knowledge. But, they do not know the objective weights kq  for each of 
the public signals that they should use to form their expectations. Instead, each agent has a 
private belief about these weights that we denote by ),,( 1
i
K
ii qqq K= . Of course, these 
weights must sum up to one, so that they are contained in a K-dimensional simplex, 
  
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ =∧≤≤ℜ∈=Δ∈ ∑ 110
k
kk
KKi qqqq . 
An agent who believes that relative precisions are given by iq  has a posterior subjective 
belief about θ  that is described by a normal distribution with ( ) ∑=
k
k
i
k
i yqYE θ  and 
( ) )|( YVYV i θθ = .  
2.4. Equilibrium Strategies 
A strategy is a function ai, such that: ( ) { }1,0∈Yai , where ( ) 0=Yai  means that agent i will 
not attack and ( ) 1=Yai  that she will attack. Denote a strategy profile by ]1,0[)( ∈= iiaa .  
For a given vector of public signals Y, the proportion of attacking speculators is ( )∫
1
0
diYai . 
The central bank devaluates the currency if this proportion exceeds θ . Thus, for any vector of 
public announcements Y and for any strategy profile a, the currency will be devaluated if and 
only if    
   ( )∫=<
1
0
* )( diYaY iθθ . 
Thereby, the decision problem of a single agent boils down to attack if and only if the 
subjective probability for the state being worse than some threshold *θ  is sufficiently large.  
The expected payoff from an attack for agent i, given the strategy combination a, the 
vector of public signals Y, and the agent’s subjective beliefs iq , is 
   ( )( ) tqYYR i −< ,Pr *θθ , 
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where ),|Pr( iqYL  denotes the subjective probability that an agent with subjective beliefs iq  
attributes to the event of devaluation. Given the normality of subjective conditional 
distributions, we can express the expected payoff using the cumulative standard normal 
distribution Φ . Agent i attacks the currency if  
( ) ( )
( ) 0
*
>−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −Φ t
YV
YEY
R
i
i
θ
θθ
 
    ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛Φ−<⇔ − R
tYVYYE i 1* θθθ .    (1) 
Recall that conditional variances are the same for all agents. Equation (1) shows that an 
agent attacks if her posterior expectation is below some threshold, at which the expected 
reward from an attack equals its costs. The proportion of attackers is the proportion of all 
agents with a subjective expectation below this threshold. For an equilibrium strategy 
combination, this proportion must equal the critical proportion at the marginal state *θ , i.e. 
  
    
( ) ( )
K
iiKi
R
tYVYYEq
Y Δ
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛Φ−<Δ∈
=
−1*
*
)(
)(
θθθ
θ , (2) 
and the associated equilibrium strategy is 1)(* =Ya i  if and only if inequality (1) holds for i’s 
subjective weights iq . 
Equation (2) is equivalent to   
    
⎪⎪⎭
⎪⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛Φ
−<Δ∈⋅Δ= ∑ ∑=
=
−
K
k
K
k k
k
i
k
Ki
K
R
t
yqq
1
1
2
1
**
1
1
τ
θθ .  (3) 
Any solution to this equation )(* Yθ  characterizes an equilibrium. To proceed the analysis, let 
us first define    
    
∑
=
− ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛Φ
−=
K
k k
R
t
1
2
1
1
τ
θ   and  θθ += 1 . 
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Private beliefs about the relative precision of multiple public signals are in general not 
sufficient for equilibrium uniqueness. Consider, for example, the case where all signals hint at 
some intermediate state of the economy, in particular θθ << ky  for all k. All agents update 
their information by forming posterior beliefs that are a weighted average of these signals, so 
that θθθ << )|( YEi  for all i. For these posteriors, an attack has a positive expected payoff if 
all agents attack and a negative expected payoff if almost nobody attacks. Agents agree to 
disagree in their posterior expectations, but it is common knowledge that everybody believes 
an attack to be rewarding if everybody attacks, and to fail if almost nobody attacks. The game 
has two pure-strategy equilibria as in the standard model for intermediate states. There are at 
least three solutions to equation (3), 0* =θ , 1* =θ , and at least one equilibrium with 
10 * << θ  where agents with expectations below some interior threshold attack. 
It is a necessary condition for a unique equilibrium that at least one of the signals is outside 
the intermediate region ),( θθ . Whether there is a unique equilibrium or multiple equilibria 
depends on the vector of public announcements Y and on the distribution of private beliefs iq . 
A general algebraic characterization is intractable. To get an intuition for uniqueness 
conditions, we characterise them for a particular distribution of private weights iq  and for 
three special cases for the number of signals, K = 2, K = 3 and K → ∞ . Then, we explain the 
rationale that carries over to general settings.  
3 – Equilibrium uniqueness 
In this section, we derive some conditions for equilibrium uniqueness for different numbers of 
public signals. We show that public information, if interpreted or dealt differently by agents, 
can lead to a unique equilibrium, even in some cases where the objective posterior hints at a 
state at which an attack may occur out of self-fulfilling prophecies, if this posterior is 
common knowledge. While the two-dimensional case is useful to illustrate the consequences 
of private information about variances, some results are not robust with respect to the number 
of signals. We solve the case for three signals which is more complicated, but yields robust 
insights in the interaction between the particular signals and the distribution of private beliefs 
for the determinacy of equilibrium behaviour. Finally, we solve the case for an infinite 
number of public signals under more general conditions. This case shows how the accuracy of 
public announcements affects the existence of multiple equilibria. 
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For our formal analysis we assume that subjective weights iq  have a uniform distribution 
on the K-dimensional unit simplex. The corresponding density function is h(qi) = 1/S, 
Δ∈∀ iq K, where || KS Δ=  is the size of the K-dimensional unit simplex.  
3.1. Two public signals (K = 2) 
Suppose there are just two public announcements, 1y  and 2y . We know already that there are 
multiple equilibria, if both signals are in the interval ),( θθ . Now assume, instead, that one 
signal hints at a particular bad state at which an attack is a dominant strategy, e.g. θ<1y . 
Then, there is a positive mass of agents, who believe that attacking is a dominant strategy. 
Since the distribution is common knowledge, other agents know that there are some fellows, 
who believe strongly in the worst news and will attack. Thus, they expect a critical mass of 
attacking capital that raises their own threshold up to which an attack is a dominant strategy. 
Agents with higher posteriors will attack, because they know that a certain fraction of agents 
attacks anyway. Since other agents know this as well, some traders with even higher 
posteriors attack. Higher order beliefs, expressed by the iterative elimination of dominated 
strategies, lead agents to attack up to some threshold that may represent a unique equilibrium. 
But, uniqueness requires that at least one signal is outside the multiplicity region and that the 
distribution is sufficiently thick (in particular at the edges), so that enough mass is attracted in 
each step of the elimination procedure.  
With one signal in the “attack” region, θ<1y , and the other in the multiplicity region, 
θθ << 2y , there exists one equilibrium, in which all agents attack. Here, the elimination 
procedure may eliminate any other equilibrium. Vice versa, if there is one signal in the “not 
attack” region, θ>2y , and the other is in the multiplicity area: there exists one equilibrium, 
in which no agent attacks and it may be the only one. Whether the elimination process stops 
before the threshold reaches the other signal and there are multiple equilibria or not, depends 
on the distribution of private weights iq .  
If there is one signal in each of the two extreme regions, the elimination procedure reduces 
the multiplicity region from both sides and may lead to a unique equilibrium with an 
intermediate threshold, such that all agents with pessimistic beliefs (below the threshold) 
attack, while agents with more optimistic beliefs refrain from attacking. Whether the 
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elimination from both sides stops at the same point and yields a unique equilibrium or not, 
depends once more on the distribution of private weights.  
For a uniform distribution of weights iq  on the simplex 2Δ , we can show that there are 
multiple equilibria if and only if both signals are inside the multiplicity region. For just two 
signals, the equilibrium condition (3) can be simplified to   
  { }θθθ +<−+∈= *12* )1(]1,0[ yqyqq  = ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−
−+<∈
12
1
*
]1,0[
yy
yqq θθ . 
An equilibrium with 0* =θ  exists, whenever θ≥1y . An equilibrium with 1* =θ  exists, 
whenever θ≤2y . For a uniform distribution of weights, an intermediate equilibrium is given 
by   
  
21
1*
12
1
*
*
1 yy
y
yy
y
−+
−=⇔−
−+= θθθθθ . 
An intermediate equilibrium exists if and only if 1
1 2
0 1
1
y
y y
θ−< <+ − . For 112 <− yy  this 
condition is equivalent to θθ <<< 21 yy . For these public signals there are three equilibria. 
For 112 >− yy , an equilibrium with 10 * << θ  exists, if and only if 21 yy <<< θθ , i.e. if 
the lower signal hints at a state, at which attacking is a dominant strategy and the high signal 
hints at a state where not-attacking is a dominant strategy. Since this condition rules out 
equilibria in which all or no agent attack, the game has a unique equilibrium with an interior 
threshold that arises from an iterative elimination procedure as illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Iterative elimination of dominated strategies. 
If θ<1y  and θθ << 2y , there is only one equilibrium, in which all agents attack. If θ>2y  
and θθ << 1y , there is a unique equilibrium, in which no agent attacks. Combining these 
results, multiple equilibria exist if and only if all signals are in the intermediate region. 
Proposition 1: For a uniform distribution of subjective weights, the game with two public 
signals has multiple equilibria if and only if θθ << ky  for both k. 
This result shows that it makes a crucial difference, whether agents know the variances of 
public signals or not. For known variances, agents agree on the posterior and multiple 
equilibria exist, whenever this posterior is in ),( θθ . For unknown variances, multiplicity may 
require that all signals are in this region.  
The simplicity of this result is due to the assumptions that the weights q are uniformly 
distributed and 2=K . However, it is not a general condition for multiplicity that all signals 
must be contained in the intermediate region. This can be seen by either assuming another 
distribution of weights or by considering more than two signals. For the case with 2=K , 
suppose that the distribution of subjective weights 2q  is uni-modal around 0.5. If the center of 
the interval ],[ 21 yy  is in the multiplicity region, there are less agents with posterior 
expectations in the dominance regions than for a uniform distribution. The cumulative 
distribution of posterior beliefs may intersect the hurdle to success up to three times, which 
may give us multiple equilibria even if  21 yy <<< θθ . An example is shown in Figure 2. 
 
1
y1 θ  
*θ  
= unique 
equilibrium 
θ  y2 θ 
hurdle 
Cumulative 
distribution of 
posteriors 
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Figure 2. Multiple equilibria for a uni-modal distribution of posteriors. 
Indeed, with K=3, we get a similar shape for the cumulative distribution of posterior beliefs 
even with a uniform distribution of q on the unit simplex.  
3.2. Equilibrium in the case of three public signals 
To analyze uniqueness conditions with more than two signals, we treat both sides of equation 
(3) as functions of *θ . Both sides are continuous and increasing in *θ , and the right hand side 
is restricted between zero and one. At the lowest and at the highest equilibrium, the derivative 
of the right hand side with respect to *θ  stays below 1. Multiplicity requires that there is an 
intermediate equilibrium, at which the cumulative distribution of posteriors rises faster than 
the hurdle. That is    
   Kk
k
i
k
K
d
yqqd
Δ>⎭
⎬⎫⎩⎨
⎧ +<Δ∈ ∑
*
*
θ
θθ
.    (4) 
For K = 3, the equilibrium condition is written as follows: 
   { }θθθ +<++Δ∈= *3322113* 32 yqyqyqq . 
If 
{ }
2
3
* <θd
qd
, the game has a unique equilibrium. 
 
θ 
y1 0 1 y2 
1 
hurdle 
distribution of posteriors if 
weights qi have a uni-
modal distribution 
=> possibility for multiple 
equilibria 
interior  
equilibrium *θ  
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Proposition 2: For a uniform distribution of subjective weights, the game with three public 
signals has a unique equilibrium if 213 >− yy .   
Proof: See appendix. 
For more than two public signals, uniqueness or multiplicity depends on the precise 
interaction between the distribution of signals and subjective weights. If all signals are close 
to each other and cover the intermediate region ),( θθ , then there are multiple equilibria, even 
for a uniform distribution of weights. However, if there is sufficient dispersion between the 
highest and the lowest signal, then uniqueness of the equilibrium is guaranteed independent 
from the range that is covered by these signals.  
In particular, for 213 >− yy , the slope of the cumulative distribution of posteriors is 
smaller than 1. Therefore, it can intersect the hurdle function between θ  and θ  only once, so 
that there is a unique equilibrium. If the distribution of weights is more concentrated on the 
center of the simplex, then the extreme signals need to be even further away from each other 
to guarantee uniqueness.  
The intuition behind this result is the following. If at least one signal is outside the region 
),( θθ , the equilibrium may be unique and it can be derived by iterative elimination of 
dominated strategies. The iteration process starts with agents whose posteriors are such that 
either attacking or not-attacking is a dominated strategy. For the remaining agents with 
posteriors close to the edges of ),( θθ , either action looses its appeal, if they know that the 
proportion of attacking agents is bounded away from zero or one, respectively. This leads to a 
smaller region for which neither action is dominant strategy. The size of these steps of 
elimination depends on the mass of agents for whom either action can be predicted from their 
extreme beliefs. If the number of agents with extreme beliefs is small, then the iteration 
procedures stop early and the interval for which posterior beliefs are self-fulfilling is reduced 
only slightly. However, if a sufficiently large mass of agents is in the respective dominance 
region, the iteration steps are large and converge to a single threshold. 
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3.3. Equilibrium in the case of an infinite number of public signals 
We determine the analytical solution for equilibrium uniqueness in the case where the number 
of public signals tends to infinity and give some intuition for a large but finite number of 
signals. 
To ease the exposition, we assume 22 ττ =k  for all k. That is, all signals have the same 
precision. However, we keep the assumption that agents have private beliefs about these 
precisions. While the objective weights are Kqk /1=  for all k, individuals attach private 
weights to the signals. When all signals have the same precision, the conditional variance of 
θ  is KYVar /)|( 2τθ = . The aggregate uncertainty after realization of signals becomes 
smaller with an increasing number of signals. With an infinite number of signals, K → ∞ , the 
uncertainty vanishes and agents are almost sure that their private posterior coincides with the 
true state θ . However, since agents differ in their evaluation of the various signals, they still 
disagree in their posterior beliefs. With 0)|( →YVar θ , the range of posteriors for which there 
is no dominant strategy converges to the unit interval, )1,0(),( →θθ .  
Due to the law of large numbers, the distribution of realized signals is almost certainly 
identical to the prior distribution of signals, ),(~ 2τθNyk . However, the distribution of 
posterior beliefs, ∑∞
=
=
1
)(
k
k
i
k
i yqE θ , depends also on the distribution of private weights 
∞Δ∈iq . Any distribution of weights induces a distribution of posteriors with probability one. 
Denote the cumulative density function of the distribution of posterior beliefs by F. The 
equilibrium condition (3) is then equivalent to )( ** θθ F= .  
Multiplicity of equilibria requires that there is a solution to this equation, at which 
1)( * >θf , where f is the non-cumulative density of posteriors. For a uniform distribution of 
weights on the simplex and for any single peaked symmetric distribution on the simplex, the 
induced density of posteriors f has its maximum at the true state θ . This maximum decreases 
to zero with an increase in ∞→2τ . Hence, there is a critical level for the variance of public 
signals, such that for a higher variance there is a unique equilibrium for all realizations of θ . 
For lower variances, there may be multiple equilibria for some realizations of )1,0(∈θ . An 
example is illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Multiple equilibria may exist for some )1,0(∈θ ,if 2τ  is sufficiently small. 
The higher τ2, the flatter is the distribution of posteriors. 
Proposition 3: For any single-peaked symmetric distribution of weights on the simplex ∞Δ , 
multiplicity of equilibria requires that 2τ  is sufficiently small. 
 
3.4. Intuition for K finite larger than 3 
If public signals are rather precise, then most signals are close to the true state θ . Thereby, 
most agents’ posteriors are close to the true state, even though they differ in their opinion 
about the relative precision of signals. If the true state happens to be in the interior of the 
region ),( θθ , then there are multiple equilibria for a sufficiently high precision of public 
signals. This occurs with some positive probability. The lower the precision of public signals, 
the wider the dispersion of posterior beliefs and the smaller is the region of states, for which 
multiple equilibria exist. Thereby, the probability that the economy is endangered by self-
fulfilling beliefs gets smaller. If the precision of public signals is sufficiently small, then there 
is a unique equilibrium for all states θ .  
This shows that the precision of public signals is related to the prior probability of an 
economy being endangered by crises out of self-fulfilling beliefs. In this sense, our results 
lead to a similar conclusion as the global-game approach by Morris and Shin (2003): 
uniqueness requires that public information is not too precise. However, our results differ 
θ 
0 1
1
hurdle
2τ  large => unique equilibrium 
 
2τ  small => possibility for 
multiple equilibria 
density of posteriors ))(( θiEf  
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from those by Morris and Shin, because we did not rely on the existence of rather precise 
private information. Instead, all that we need for uniqueness is a sufficient dispersion of 
public signals and private beliefs about their relative importance. These private beliefs are 
common knowledge in our model: all agents know the distribution of these weights, and in an 
economy with a finite number of agents, our results would still hold, if agents know the actual 
weights of all other agents. Therefore, posterior beliefs are common knowledge, while 
uniqueness in the global-game approach requires that posterior beliefs are not only different, 
but private information as well. 
4 – The effect of public announcements: some implications for economic 
policy 
Our analysis of the currency-attack model with multiple public signals has some 
consequences in terms of economic and informational policies. The model contributes to shed 
light on the current debate on the effects of reinforced transparency. Indeed, the fact that 
central banks and newspapers release information publicly raises concerns of whether 
economic transparency may be destabilising, by rendering the economy prone to self-
fulfilling crashes. This question is rather important with the adhesion by the IMF to 
programmes like the SDDS (Special Data Dissemination Standard). Nevertheless, our model 
suggests a counterargument to the traditional view: agents deal the same information 
differently and posterior beliefs may differ even if all information is publicly disclosed, as 
soon as there are multiple public signals. 
We have shown that there may be a unique equilibrium if there is at least one public signal 
that hints at a state at which either attacking or not-attacking is a dominant strategy. With 
multiple public signals, multiplicity of equilibria requires that (i) signals are not too dispersed 
and (ii) private beliefs about the relative precision of these signals do not differ too much. 
These two conditions interact: if signals are dispersed over a wide range, there may still be 
multiple equilibria if most agents attach the same weights to these signals and vice versa.  
With a large number of public signals, the probability of the economy being prone to self-
fulfilling beliefs depends on the average precision of signals. If signals get very precise, we 
approach the case with perfect information. The lower the precision of public signals, the 
smaller gets the set of states with multiple equilibria and the smaller is the prior probability 
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that the true state falls in this region. For a sufficiently low precision, the equilibrium is 
always unique.  
The economic policy implications of these results require to distinguish three dimensions 
of transparency: transparent central banks provide more information, i.e. a larger number of 
public signals. Another dimension of transparency is the precision of the information provided 
to markets. A third dimension concerns information about the precision of statements, for 
example reliable figures on expected forecast errors. A larger number of signals (or more 
frequent provision of information) helps to avoid overreactions to any single announcement. 
A higher precision is useful for markets in determining the consequences of actions. But, it 
also raises the probability that most signals are in the multiplicity region. Finally, if agents 
agree on the precision of signals, their posteriors coincide, which leads to the same effects as 
providing a summary statistic as a single public signal. It induces high common weights to the 
announcements that may lead to crises out of self-fulfilling beliefs if the common posterior 
indicates a critical situation.  
We have shown that agents do not always over-react to public information. Indeed, when 
there are multiple public signals whose precisions are not common knowledge- agents do not 
always have self-fulfilling beliefs. In the case where K=1, the result is completely different 
from K>1. There is a place for equilibrium uniqueness under certain conditions (whereas this 
is impossible when agents receive only one public signal because of common knowledge). As 
a consequence, the economy should be relatively more stable with 1>K . This gives a role to 
the precision of signals: apart from its degree, uncertainty on it can represent an effective tool 
for the central bank to control for the beliefs of the agents. The number of signals is also 
essential; especially having two (appropriate) public signals instead of one on the market can 
prevent from self-fulfilling equilibria by avoiding common posterior beliefs.  
However, when K>1, then increasing the number of public signals K beyond two might not 
be helpful (in terms of stabilisation) insofar as equilibrium uniqueness requires (from K>2) a 
sufficient mass on the “extreme” values (i.e. external to the interval ,θ θ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ). For example, if 
the new disclosed signals accumulate in the intermediate region, it can be worse for the 
central bank to give more announcements even if they are more precise. The contents of 
announcements is also very important. Suppose agents receive two public signals. If some 
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additional announcements (say two) cross either border, the equilibria switch to another 
regime, as represented on the next figure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Destabilization by Public Announcements. 
 
 
This effect can be reinforced if signals are of high precision: increasing the number of too 
precise public signals can lead to a situation equivalent to common knowledge and damage 
the stability of the economy. 
Finally, the number of signals is also ambiguous. Two intertwined effects go in opposite 
directions: with a large number of signals, there is a higher chance of getting signals in 
extreme areas while with a higher dimension, there might be some amplifying effects due to 
higher order beliefs. 
We thus make the case that public information is not per se (automatically) destabilising. 
Our model is less deterministic than second generation models that always give multiple 
equilibria in the intermediate zone and private information models that always find some 
conditions for uniqueness (as soon as private information is sufficiently precise). Providing 
multiple public signals does not exclude multiple equilibria, but reduces the likelihood that 
conditions for multiplicity are met. 
 Initial situation 
Situation after providing 
two more signals 
Equilibrium uniqueness ¨ Stabilisation 
Multiple equilibria ¨ Destabilisation 
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5 – Conclusion 
This paper sheds light on the difficulties linked with the dichotomy between public 
information on the one hand and private information on the other. How increasing public 
information without increasing private information, and vice versa? Those two notions should 
be linked although theory clearly distinguishes them. In the literature, there typically lacks a 
model that could show how diverse sources of information or differences in the treatment of 
information could avoid common posterior beliefs, thus creating sufficient differences in the 
evaluation of publicly available information to prevent self-fulfilling beliefs equilibria. Here, 
we try to fill in the theoretical gap between public and private information, by proposing a 
private value game applied to the traditional speculative-attack model. 
It is well known that common knowledge is difficult to establish in practice. However, 
financial markets are very transparent and many informational signals are disclosed by the 
central bank, or any other institution. On the exchange rate market, there is a plurality of 
channels (media) which disclose more or less precise (but “objectively mistaken”) public 
information. Hence, any information is observed by all the agents; as agents are rational, they 
are aware of that. Common knowledge of posterior beliefs does not only require that all 
agents share the same information, it also requires that agents share the beliefs about the 
conditional distribution of the revealed information, given the fundamentals. As a 
consequence, even if all agents share the same information, agents may differ in their 
evaluation of these signals, and thus in their posterior beliefs. This does not require private 
information. Agents may agree to disagree. By creating disparities between agents’ posterior 
beliefs, multiple sources of public information can avoid self-fulfilling beliefs equilibria. Such 
a model can help to explain why and how attacks are determined, even when the most 
relevant information about fundamentals is publicly disclosed. 
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7 – Appendix: PROOF of Proposition 2 
First, note that 2/33 =Δ . For 3=K  the equilibrium condition (3) is given by  
 { }θθθ +≤++Δ∈= *3322113* 32 yqyqyqq .     (4) 
With a uniform distribution of weights on the simplex, there is a positive mass of agents, who 
believe strongly in the worst signal and a positive mass of agents who believe strongly in the 
best signal. Hence, an equilibrium in which all agents attack and 1* =θ  exists, if and only if 
θ≤ky  for all k. An equilibrium in which no agent attacks and 0* =θ  exists if and only 
if θ≥ky  for all k. 
Multiple equilibria require the existence of at least one interior equilibrium, 10 * << θ , at 
which the derivative of the right hand side of (4) with respect to *θ  exceeds 1.  
For any interior equilibrium,   
  { }θθθ +=++Δ∈= *3322113* 32 yqyqyqq .     (5) 
Hence, an interior equilibrium requires that 3
*
1 yy <+< θθ . So, there exists a linear 
combination of 1y  and 3y  with θθ +=+− *31)1( yqyq AA , which is equivalent to   
  
13
1
*
yy
yqA −
−+= θθ . 
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In Figures 3a and 3b this point is given by A. Now we distinguish two cases: If 
θθ +≥ *2y , then there also exists a linear combination of 1y  and 2y  that equals θθ +* . This 
is indicated by point B in Figure 6a. Any combination of weights on the straight line between 
A and B is associated with the same expected state. In an equilibrium of this type, the area on 
the simplex below the line AB divided by the total size of the simplex equals *θ . 
If θθ +< *2y , then there exists a linear combination of 2y  and 3y  that equals θθ +* . 
This is indicated by point B in Figure 6b. Again, any combination of weights on the straight 
line between A and B is associated with the same expected state. In an equilibrium of this 
type, *θ  equals the area on the simplex below the line AB divided by the total size of the 
simplex. 
 
Figure 6a.      Figure 6b.    
In both figures the shaded area is the unit simplex. Points on the simplex below AB are 
associated with posterior expectations ∑
=
+≤
3
1
*
k
kk yq θθ .     
If θθ +≥ *2y , the coordinates of B are ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−+
−
−− 0,,
12
1
*
12
*
2
yy
y
yy
y θθθθ . Basic rules of 
trigonometry enable us to calculate that the area below AB; the latter has the size 
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−+= θθθ . The right-hand side is increasing and concave in *θ . So, the 
derivative of the right-hand side is maximal at the highest *θ  at which the condition 
θθ +≥ *2y  applies, i.e. at θθ −= 2* y . Here the derivative is )(
2
13 yy −
. 
If θθ +< *2y , the coordinates of B are ⎟⎟⎠
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y θθ . Thus, the condition for an interior equilibrium 
(5) is equivalent to 
)()(
)(1
1323
2*
3*
yyyy
y
−−
−−−= θθθ . The right-hand side is increasing and convex 
in *θ . So, the derivative of the right-hand side is maximal at the lowest *θ  at which the 
condition θθ +< *2y  applies, i.e. at θθ −= 2* y . Here the derivative is )(
2
13 yy −
. 
Combining the two cases, we see that for any interior equilibrium the derivative of the 
right-hand side of (4) is lower than 1 if 213 >− yy .  
Thus, we conclude that 213 >− yy  is a sufficient condition for a unique equilibrium. 
            QED 
 
